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While India did not use antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing measures (temporary trade barriers) 
prior to 1992, it subsequently came to become the WTO system’s dominant user of those policies. Using 
detailed product-level data from the World Banks’ Temporary Trade Barriers Database from 1992-2009, we 
first study India’s use of temporary trade barriers over time, and across products, sectors and targeted 
countries, to then establish changes in previous patterns that may have taken place during the global 
economic crisis of 2008-2009. We find that there has been an increase in the stock of products subject to 
antidumping measures during 1992-2009. Moreover, the percentage of tariff line products affected by an 
antidumping measure increased during the recent global recession, from 1.82% in 2007 to 4.03% in 2009, 
and the evidence suggests that such increase is larger than would be predicted by the observed pre-crisis 
trend. We also find a shift in the incidence of India’s antidumping policy towards China and other 
developing countries in recent years. Furthermore, another dimension along which India’s antidumping 
protection increased during 2008-9 was via the failure to remove policies that were imposed prior to the 
global economic crisis and were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the five-year ‘Sunset 
Review’ limit. There was also an increase in India’s use of global safeguard investigations as well as China-
specific safeguards during the global economic crisis. However, the process of tariff liberalisation 
continued during such period, and it is possible that India’s use of temporary trade barriers might have 
helped it move in that direction. 
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India implemented a significant unilateral trade liberalisation reform as part of an arrangement with 
the International Monetary Fund requested in 1991, following a balance of payments crisis. With the 
reform, the import-weighted average tariff decreased from 87.0% in 1990-1 to 24.6% in 1996-7. The 
sharpest tariff reductions took place from 1991 to 1992, and while India had not used the WTO-permitted 
‘contingent’ forms of import protection such as antidumping, safeguards, or countervailing measures 
before, it initiated its first antidumping investigation in 1992 and it went on to become the WTO system’s 
foremost user of antidumping policies by 2001. India also initiated its first safeguard investigation in 1997. 
In this paper we examine India’s use of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing measures—
jointly referred to as temporary trade barriers—from 1992 to 2009, making use of detailed product-level 
data from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a). We also study the use of 
such policies during the global recession years of 2008-9 and compare it to trends from previous years. We 
focus on whether there have been important changes regarding not only India’s aggregate use of 
temporary trade barriers, but also their incidence across products, sectors and targeted countries, as well as 
the amount of time that these ‘temporary’ measures stay in place, and the relationship between their use 
and India’s WTO commitments regarding applied tariffs.  
Although India’s financial sector was not overexposed to subprime lending and was thus able to 
avoid the direct effect of the global financial crisis, its economy was severely affected by the worldwide 
recession.1 As shown in Figure 1, India’s growth in GDP per capita decreased from 8.2% in 2007 to 3.7% 
in 2008. Moreover, exports and imports decreased sharply in 2009, in contrast to previous periods of 
economic contraction such as 1997 and the early 2000s. During the recent recession there was also 
considerable attention in the media about a potential trade war with China due to India’s extension of its 
ban on imports of Chinese dairy products and the imposition of a temporary ban on imports of Chinese 
toys in 2009, as well as the large number of antidumping investigations initiated against China over a 
variety of products (including steel and textiles) in 2008-9.2 This raises the question of whether India’s 
‘protectionism’ changed during the global economic crisis.  
We first provide information on the behavior of India’s aggregate and product-level use of 
antidumping—both the ‘flow’ of new investigations as well as the ‘stock’ of measures in place—over time. 
                                                          
1 See, for example, Bajpai (2010). 
2 See, for example, The Times of India (2009a, 2009b), and Hindustan Times (2009). 
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While the flow data indicate that the annual share of 8-digit Harmonized System (HS) products subject to 
a new antidumping investigation reached a peak of 2.10% in 2007, the stock measure in particular allows 
us to infer that the product coverage of antidumping policies has increased during 1992 through 2009. 
Moreover, the percentage of products affected by antidumping measures as well as the percentage of 
India’s import value with antidumping measures in place experienced a sizeable increase during the 
recession years of 2008 and 2009. Using data at the tariff line (8-digit HS) product level, we find that the 
percentage of products subject to antidumping measures increased from 1.82% in 2007 to 4.03% in 2009, 
and that this increase is larger than what the pre-crisis trend would predict. 
Our next contribution is to examine the use of antidumping policy by sector. Almost half of 
India’s antidumping investigations were initiated by the chemicals sector, and the other main users of 
antidumping have been plastics/rubber, machinery/electrical, metals, and textiles. Those sectors also have 
the largest number of antidumping initiations worldwide. Furthermore, those were the top five users of 
antidumping in India during the global recession of 2008-9, and most of them display an increasing trend 
in the percentage of sectoral import value affected by antidumping measures since 1992. Finally, those 
main users of antidumping also account for an important fraction of India’s import value—37% for the 
1992-2009 period—which indicates that antidumping policy may have economically important effects in 
India.  
We then study the countries that are affected by India’s antidumping policies. China was the most 
frequent target of Indian antidumping (in terms of both investigations and measures imposed), and the 
average size of the antidumping import restriction against China is also the highest of any targeted country. 
This bias in the incidence of antidumping policy against China accelerated during 2008-9. More broadly, 
the share of investigations targeting developing countries increased from 48% in 1992-2007 to 71% in 
2008-9, while the share of imports from those countries remained fairly stable.3 The shift in incidence 
towards China and other developing countries over time is also observed with regards to the stock of 
product-exporter combinations that are affected by an antidumping measure. In 1997, 53% of India’s 
stock of antidumping measures affected developed countries, 22% affected China, and 24% affected other 
developing countries. In contrast, by 2009 only 25% of the stock of measures was imposed against 
developed countries, while 39% was imposed against China and 36% against other developing countries. 
                                                          
3 The share of imports from China did exhibit a substantial increase, as we detail in Section 3.3. 
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This result is consistent with Bown’s (2010b) argument that antidumping is increasingly a ‘South-South’ 
phenomenon.4  
We also find that there are several instances in which, after having imposed an antidumping 
measure in a previous year, India imposed new antidumping measures against different exporters of the 
same product in subsequent years. We also provide some evidence (subject to the available data) that in an 
important number of those cases the newly affected exporting countries had not exported the product to 
India in the years preceding the initial investigation. These results suggest that trade diversion has played an 
important role in leading to additional use of antidumping policy. They might also mean that India is using 
antidumping policy as a form of import protection not conditional on the actual presence of dumping. 
We then examine the actual duration of India’s antidumping measures. According to the WTO’s 
Antidumping Agreement, a ‘Sunset Review’ process should take place after five years of the imposition of 
a measure, and the measure should be removed unless it is determined that its removal would be likely to 
generate injury due to renewed dumping. We find that 60% of the measures imposed were removed after 
no more than five years. Moreover, antidumping measures in the chemical sector and measures against 
China both tend to last longer than the average. In addition, we find that another dimension through 
which antidumping protection increased during the global economic crisis of 2008-9 was via the failure to 
remove policies imposed prior to the crisis that were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the 
five-year limit. 
Another issue we consider is potential evidence that India used antidumping to increase import 
restrictions to levels that would otherwise violate the rules of the WTO system. For example, if India were 
to have increased its applied tariff rate instead, how often would that result in a violation of its WTO 
commitments? We find some evidence consistent with that argument, and we also provide additional 
evidence of a shift in India’s antidumping protection towards developing countries during the recent global 
recession.  
Although antidumping has been the dominant temporary trade barrier in India, we also examine 
other relatively substitutable forms of temporary import protection. We begin by characterizing India’s use 
of global safeguards over time and we find that although the largest number of safeguard investigations 
was initiated during the global economic crisis of 2008-9, most of them did not result in the imposition of 
                                                          
4 Bown (2010b) performs a cross-country examination of the use of temporary trade barriers over time, and he uses product 
data at the 6-digit HS level. We use more disaggregated tariff line data at the 8-digit HS product level for India. 
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a final safeguard measure. We also provide information regarding the sectors with higher safeguard activity 
as well as the number of products affected. The chemical sector is, again, India’s major user of safeguard 
measures. Next, we describe India’s use of China-specific safeguards as well as countervailing measures. 
There was an increase in the use of China-specific safeguards during the recent global economic crisis that 
has affected various imported products. India has only initiated one countervailing measure investigation 
so far, which took place in 2009 and also targeted China.  
Our final contribution is to study whether the alternative forms of temporary trade barriers have 
been used across similar products and/or sectors. Overall, we find that while there is not much overlap of 
different temporary trade barriers over the same (8-digit HS) products, there is substantial overlap 
regarding the sectors that use those policies; and those features of the use of temporary trade barriers have 
not changed much during the global recession years. We also examine the interaction between the use of 
temporary trade barriers and applied import tariffs. Moreover, we relate our results to those of Bown and 
Tovar (2011), which studies the link between India’s tariff liberalization reform and its subsequent use of 
antidumping and safeguard policies over 2000-2002. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide an overview of India’s 
trade liberalisation experience. Section 3 examines India’s use of antidumping. Section 4 describes the use 
of other temporary trade barriers by India, including global safeguards, China-specific safeguards, and 
countervailing measures. In Section 5, we examine the interaction among alternative temporary trade 
barriers, as well as their interaction with most-favored nation applied tariffs. We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2 India’s Unilateral Trade Liberalisation 
India was one of the initial 23 Contracting Parties to the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade that laid the groundwork for the post-World War II, rules-based trading system (Irwin, Mavroidis, 
and Sykes, 2008). It was one of the key proponents seeking major exceptions to basic WTO rules that 
limited the use of quantitative restrictions and tariffs.  
Between 1947 and the late 1980s, India followed an inward-oriented development strategy. It was 
characterised by import protection, complex industrial licensing requirements, significant intervention in 
financial markets and government ownership of heavy industry (Cerra and Saxena, 2002). International 
trade was significantly restricted by high tariffs and non-tariff barriers, which included import licensing, 
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state monopoly of some imports and exports (‘canalisation’), government purchases that favored domestic 
producers, and restrictions on imports by intermediaries.   
 A combination of external shocks in the late 1980s and early 1990s led to larger macroeconomic 
imbalances. Increased import costs due to high oil prices, a decrease in remittances from Indian workers 
because of the conflict in the Middle East, weak demand in export markets, a deterioration of the fiscal 
position and the current account deficit, high external debt, and rising political uncertainty led to a loss of 
confidence by investors and capital outflows. The loss of international reserves continued and ended in a 
severe balance of payments crisis.5  
In August 1991, India requested a stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund. 
Among the conditions for the arrangement was that India had to implement major structural reforms, 
including trade liberalisation, financial sector reform and tax reform.  
Before the reform, in 1990-1, the import-weighted average of tariffs was 87%, the simple average 
was 128%, and some tariffs were over 300%. Moreover, non-tariff barriers (especially quantitative 
restrictions) affected imports of 65% of all products and 90% of manufactures (Srinivasan, 2001). The 
subsequent reform package included a significant reduction in the average level as well as the dispersion of 
tariffs. The maximum tariff fell from 355% in 1990-1 to 150% in 1991-2, and to 30.8% by 2002-3. The 
weighted average tariff decreased from 87% in 1990-1 to 24.6% in 1996-7, although it then gradually 
increased to reach 38.5% in 2001-2. The increase coincided with a significant lifting of quantitative 
restrictions (Narayanan, 2006), and it was possible because India’s tariff bindings from the Uruguay Round 
were set at much higher levels than the applied rates (Srinivasan, 2001).6 The simple average tariff rate fell 
from 128% in 1990-1 to 34.4% in 1997-8. It then increased to 40.2% in 1998-9 but continued decreasing 
after that. In 2002-3, the simple and weighted averages of tariffs were 29% (Narayanan, 2006).  
As reported by Topalova (2004), there was a sharp decrease in tariffs in most industries from 1991 
to 1992—the sharpest reduction in average tariffs and their dispersion took place from 1991 to 1992. 
Quantitative restrictions on most imports have been eliminated. In 1991, most quantitative restrictions on 
intermediate and capital goods were removed, and the list of goods subject to quantitative restrictions was 
reduced significantly (although it was still long) to include mainly consumer goods and agricultural 
                                                          
5 See Cerra and Saxena (2002) for a discussion of the factors that led to the crisis.  
6 India imposed bindings on 62% of the tariff lines of industrial products. Before the Uruguay Round, only 3% of tariff lines 
had bindings (National Board of Trade, 2005). 
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products.7 The Uruguay Round agreement, signed in 1994, required the elimination of quantitative 
restrictions and India’s quantitative restrictions expired on 1 April 2001.8  
As a result of the reforms, total trade as a percentage of GDP increased from an average of 13% in 
the 1980s to almost 19% in 1999-2000. The volume of exports and imports has also increased significantly 
since the early 1990s (Topalova, 2004). Lastly, and importantly, the first antidumping case was initiated in 
1992.  
  
3 India’s Use of Antidumping 
India introduced legislation on antidumping in 1985, and it was subsequently reformed to conform 
with obligations after 1995. In 1998, a separate division—the Directorate-General of Anti-dumping and 
Allied Duties—was created within the Department of Commerce, which had more staff and dedicated 
resources to manage antidumping complaints and recommend antidumping duties. Narayanan (2006) also 
reports that in the 1990s the government frequently and publicly informed the domestic industries about 
the availability of antidumping (and safeguard) measures. Duties are levied by the Ministry of Finance.9 
 
3.1 Antidumping Investigations and Measures 
Table 1 documents the year-by-year data on India’s antidumping use between its first case initiated 
in 1992 just after the commencement of the trade liberalisation reforms (1991) through 2009.10 As India 
started the process of trade liberalisation, the use of antidumping took off, and it presented an increasing 
trend until 2002. There is a decrease in the number of initiations in 2003 and 2004, but an increase 
thereafter until 2008. In conjunction with the spread of the global economic crisis, India initiated 54 
antidumping cases in 2008 and another 32 during 2009.11,12 
                                                          
7 According to estimates by the World Bank, the share of imports from all sectors included in their study and covered by non-
tariff barriers decreased from 95% in 1988-9 to 62% in 1998-9, and to 24% in 1999-2000 (Srinivasan, 2001). 
8 A small number of quantitative restrictions permitted under Articles XX and XXI of the GATT remain on grounds of health, 
safety and moral conduct (Narayanan, 2006). 
9 On the requirements to initiate an investigation as well as the timeline for the findings and imposition of duties, see for 
example Aggarwal (2002) and National Board of Trade (2005). 
10 Indian antidumping data is taken from the Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a). The working paper 
accompanying the database describes the detailed data, but in short, the data for India was taken directly from what the 
Directorate General of Antidumping and Allied Duties in the Ministry of Commerce publicly reported in The Gazette of India 
http://commerce.nic.in/ad_cases.htm . 
11 During the period covering 1995 to 2009, India was the top initiator of antidumping cases, followed by the US, the EU, 
Argentina and South Africa. India also had the highest number of antidumping measures imposed. 
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In addition to the data on new industry demands for antidumping protection, Table 1 also presents 
a breakdown over time of the number of investigations begun each year that resulted in the imposition of 
new import restrictions. Of the 588 investigations started during 1992-2009, 420 or 71% have resulted in 
the imposition of new definitive trade barriers. Excluding 2009, for which some data on final measures is 
not yet available, that share increases to 74%. A lack of evidence of dumping was found in only 26 cases 
and no injury was found in 42 cases. Only 16 cases were withdrawn or terminated. The main implication 
of these figures is that not only is the number of Indian antidumping initiations high, but the vast majority 
of cases result in the imposition of new trade barriers.  
The combined information on the large number of Indian antidumping cases and the high 
frequency with which they result in new and definitive import restrictions raises a number of basic 
questions about the economic scale of this particular form of import protection. For example, despite the 
2003-6 relative drop in frequency of newly initiated investigations, by other measures the scope of 
antidumping protection steadily increased throughout the entire 1992-2009 period. Consider Figure 2a, 
which, instead of simply using the number of investigations as its unit of observations, measures 
antidumping use by the percentage of imported 6-digit HS products affected. Figure 2a uses this share of 
imported 6-digit HS product subject to antidumping to plot both the flow of new investigations over time, 
as well as the stock of imposed antidumping measures.13 It is clear that even though there was a decline in 
the number of new investigations over the 2003-6 period, a likely contributor to this was the stock of 
antidumping measures already in place resulting from earlier (pre-2003) investigations, which continued to 
climb through 2009. If imports are already being restricted by trade barriers, there is a reduced need for 
new antidumping investigations.  
The figure also shows a significant increase in the percentage of 6-digit HS products affected by 
antidumping measures in the recession years of 2008 and 2009, which almost doubled from 3.10% in 2007 
to 5.91% in 2009. We can ask whether this observed increase could have been predicted by the trend 
observed in previous years. Consistent with the results of Bown (2010b), we find that if we regress the 
1992-2007 data on the percentage of 6-digit products affected by an antidumping measure on a linear time 
trend and use the estimated coefficient to predict such percentage for 2009, the difference between the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
12 As we discuss in more detail below, in 2009 India started to use more aggressively other substitutable forms of contingent 
protection aside from antidumping, including global safeguards (see also Table 1), China-specific safeguards, and even 
countervailing (‘anti-subsidy’) measures. 
13 We use the year in which the first measure was imposed, even if it was a preliminary measure. 
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actual and predicted values (5.91% versus 5.00%) is not large enough to conclude that there was a 
substantial shift away from the previous trend in 2008-9. 
Since the effect of antidumping protection on a given product depends on the level of Indian 
imports that are affected by it, we also use another measure that exploits data at the bilateral level on 
whether imports of a given product from a certain exporting country are affected by antidumping. Figure 
2b thus shows the percentage of non-oil import value with new antidumping initiations and antidumping 
measures in force. This measure is based on equation (2) of Bown (2011). Again, there is an increasing 
trend in the stock of products affected by antidumping measures, which reached its peak covering 3.24% 
of India’s import value in 2009. In this case we also find that the predicted share for 2009 based on a linear 
time trend (3.66) does not differ much from the observed one (3.24). 
In Figure 2c we exploit import data at the tariff line level (available since 2000) to report the 
percentage of imported 8-digit HS products subject to new antidumping initiations and measures in force 
from 2000 to 2009. The pattern is very similar to that shown in Figure 2a; in both cases the flow of 
initiations reaches its peak in 2007 but the stock of products affected by measures continues to increase 
through 2009. In 2009, 4.03% of India’s 8-digit HS imported products were affected by antidumping 
measures.14 Moreover, we find that the percentage of 8-digit HS products affected by an antidumping 
measure in 2009 predicted by the linear time trend is substantially lower than the actual one (2.46 versus 
4.03, respectively). Thus, using the more disaggregated data we do find some evidence that India’s observed 
pattern of protectionism in 2009 was larger than predicted by historical trends.15 The difference in the 
results relative to those using data at the 6-digit HS product level is likely due to the increase over time in 
the number of 8-digit HS products within a 6-digit HS product that are affected by antidumping.16 
 
3.2 The Use of Antidumping by Sector 
Table 2 details the incidence of India’s antidumping use by taking a different approach of reporting 
the number of initiations by each 2-digit HS sector. The most frequent user of antidumping has been the 
                                                          
14 India has imported approximately 10,000 products at the 8-digit HS level annually in the last five years in our data (2005-9). 
15 This also holds if we increase the number of observations by using the average ratio of the percentage of 8-digit HS products 
affected by an antidumping measure to the corresponding percentage of 6-digit HS products affected (from 2000 to 2007) to 
proxy for the percentage of 8-digit HS products affected by an antidumping measure from 1992-9 (by applying such ratio to the 
corresponding percentage at the 6-digit HS level). In that case, the predicted percentage for 2009 is 2.36. 
16 We do not report the analogous of Figure 2b at the 8-digit HS level since import data at that level is only available since 2000, 
which implies that we do not have the value of imports before the earliest initiation affecting each product, and we would have 
to use import values that have already been affected by antidumping and would therefore provide a less accurate assessment. 
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chemicals industry, with almost half of all Indian initiations during this time period. Put differently, India’s 
chemicals sector alone initiated more antidumping cases during this period than the combined sectors of 
any other individual WTO member aside from the US, the EU and Argentina. Not surprisingly, the decline 
in new antidumping initiations in India between 2003-6 is partially explained by a decrease in the number 
of initiations by the chemicals sector, which fell by more than 60%, from an average of 31 new cases per 
year between 1999 and 2002 to an average of only 12 new cases per year between 2003 and 2006. Other 
sizeable users of Indian antidumping include plastics/rubbers, machinery/electrical, metals, and textiles; 
combined with chemicals, they are also the five sectors with most antidumping initiations worldwide 
(WTO, 2010a).17 Textiles had 13 initiations in 2005 alone, coinciding with a restructuring of the global 
textile and apparel market with a phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) and the end of textile 
quotas under the WTO’s transitional Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). The 24 initiations in the 
metals sector in 2008 (after almost no new antidumping activity in the previous five years) correspond to 
steel products and took place in November and December, coinciding with the heightening of the global 
recession. Finally, we note that the top users of antidumping during the global economic crisis of 2008-9 
are also the same five sectors that constitute the main antidumping users in India since 1992. Bown and 
Tovar (2011) provide evidence that the variation of India’s use of antidumping across sectors (in the early 
2000s) is related to India’s tariff liberalisation reform implemented in the 1990s, and that it also responds 
to political-economy motives according to the predictions of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model.  
How sizeable are imports in these manufacturing sectors that populate India’s use of antidumping? 
Over the period 1992-2009, the dominant antidumping user, chemicals, accounted for 10% of all Indian 
imports, reaching almost 15% in some years. Other major users of antidumping are also large importers, 
including machinery (17%) and metals (7%). Note that the importance of imports in these sectors to the 
Indian economy is likely to be underestimated if the level of imports in those sectors is lower than it would 
be under the counterfactual that India had not used antidumping. Figure 3 shows the number of initiations 
by year for each of the five main antidumping-user sectors, as well as the value of imports and percentage 
of India’s imports that they represent in 2000-2009. Some of those sectors (chemicals, textiles, and metals) 
experienced a decrease in imports in 2009 (Figure 3b), and India’s total imports also fell due to the 
recession. Figure 3c shows that the percentage of imports of metal products increased significantly from 
                                                          
17 This is also true if Indian initiations are excluded from the world total.  
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2003 to 2007 (from 4.7% to 7.8%) despite the use of antidumping in the preceding years, which may also 
help explain the large number of initiations in this sector in 2008 that we mentioned previously.  
We also examine the share of 4-digit HS products that were affected by an antidumping initiation 
within each of the 2-digit HS sectors that are the main antidumping users. Between 1992 and 2009, 34% of 
the 4-digit HS products in the chemical sector were affected by an antidumping initiation at some point. 
Similarly, 30% of the 4-digit HS products in the plastics/rubbers sector and 14% of the 4-digit HS 
products in the machinery/electrical sector were affected. Metals and textiles exhibit smaller shares of 
affected products, of 8% and 6%, respectively. This pattern in terms of the 2-digit HS sectors with 
more/fewer 4-digit products affected by antidumping is broadly similar during the 2008-9 recession 
period. 
To examine the potential impact of antidumping protection across sectors in more detail, Figure 4 
shows the percentage of India’s non-oil import value affected by antidumping in each of the five main-
user sectors, including both the flow of new investigations over time and the stock of imposed 
antidumping measures, computed using bilateral import data at the 6-digit HS level as described in the 
previous section. Each sector presents an increasing trend in the stock of imports affected by antidumping 
protection except metals. As already mentioned, metals experienced a decrease in antidumping initiations 
from 2003 to 2007, but due to the spike in initiations in 2008, there was a subsequent large increase in the 
stock of affected imports of metal products in 2009. The other sectors—with the exception of 
chemicals—also show a sizeable increase in the percentage of affected imports in 2009, which may be 
related to the global recession. 
 
3.3 Countries Affected by India’s Use of Antidumping 
In this section, we study how India’s use of antidumping varies across its trading partners. Are 
some exporting countries more likely to be targeted with antidumping than others? Table 3 illustrates the 
Indian use of antidumping by its twenty most frequently named foreign targets, with these targets broken 
down into developing versus developed country categories. The table also breaks down the sample period 
into two sub-periods: 1992-2007 and 2008-9. 
India has named forty countries (counting all the EU members as only one country). As shown in 
Table 3, the country most frequently named was China (130 times), followed by the EU (88), South Korea 
(45), Taiwan (42), and Thailand and Japan (32 each).  
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The investigations against China represented more than one-fifth of the total number of India’s 
antidumping investigations, and China was also the country targeted with the highest number of measures 
(109). In addition, in almost all (89%) of the investigations against China a measure was imposed. 
Furthermore, in 50% of the investigations against China, it was the only country named in the 
investigation. That share is much larger than for the other main targeted countries. Put differently, and 
while this is not shown in the table, in 53% of all product-level investigations, one of the named countries 
was China. These trends of targeting China in particular during the post-2001 period especially are quite 
typical to almost all of the antidumping-using countries in the WTO system (Bown, 2010c; Prusa, 2010).18 
In addition, the last column in Table 3 shows the mean antidumping margin by country, which suggests 
that the mean size of the antidumping import restriction is highest against China as well.19 Moreover, the 
share of investigations against China increased from 21% in 1992-2007 to 30% in the global recession 
years of 2008-9. The share of product-level investigations involving China also increased, from 50% in 
1992-2007 to 76% in 2008-9. 
Among the main targeted countries, the share of investigations against China, Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Japan, particularly, show an important increase in 2008-9. The share of measures imposed against 
Thailand and Taiwan also increased during those two years. Are these increases associated with increases 
in imports coming from those countries in particular? Table 3 shows that the share of imports from China 
almost doubled in 2008-9 relative to the previous period; however, the share of imports from the other 
aforementioned countries remained stable or even fell. In addition, the share of investigations targeting 
developing countries increased from 48% in 1992-2007 to 71% in 2008-9, while the share of imports from 
those countries stayed roughly the same. 
Figure 5a shows the number of 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations that are affected by an 
antidumping initiation over time. We divide the affected exporting countries into three groups: developed 
countries, China, and other developing countries. As shown, the number of product-exporter 
                                                          
18 Although India considers China to be a non-market economy country, it has adopted a policy whereby if it is shown that 
market conditions prevail for some firms subject to an investigation, the authorities are able to grant market-economy 
treatment. However, Kumaran (2005) notes that only in very few cases such market economy treatment was granted to 
individual exporters from China. 
19 The computation of the mean antidumping margin uses data on the final dumping margin calculations, which are reported in 
ad valorem terms. The mean is taken over the minimum and maximum final dumping margin levels that are reported and 
correspond to different targeted exporting firms of a given product (and country). We describe this in more detail in Section 3.5. 
Although there is a requirement that the antidumping duty should not exceed the dumping margin, Kumaran (2005) explains 
how under certain circumstances in India the antidumping duty may end up being higher than the dumping margin. 
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combinations targeted by new Indian antidumping initiations more than tripled in 2008 relative to 2007 in 
the case of other developing countries—while it fell in the case of China and developed countries—and 
although it decreased in 2009, it was still higher than in 2007.  
In Figure 5b, we show the percentage of 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations imported from 
developed countries, China, and other developing countries that are affected by a new antidumping 
initiation over time.20 The increase in the number of combinations of 8-digit HS products and other 
developing country exporters targeted by new antidumping initiations in 2008 from Figure 5a was 
associated with an increase in the percentage of product-exporter combinations imported from the same 
group of countries that are affected by Indian antidumping in the same year.  
It is also important to examine the stock of 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations that are 
affected by an Indian antidumping measure for each exporting country category. Figure 6a presents the 
number of such combinations while Figure 6b displays the percentage of imported combinations from 
each country category subject to Indian antidumping protection. Regarding the former, there has been a 
shift in the incidence of antidumping protection towards China and other developing countries in recent 
years. In 2006, the number of products imported from China and affected by an antidumping measure 
started to exceed the number of product-exporter combinations that are imported from antidumping-
affected developed countries. Analogously, in 2002, the number of product-exporter combinations that are 
imported from other developing countries and affected by an antidumping measure began exceeding the 
corresponding number of combinations with a developed exporter source. In 1997, for example, 53% of 
India’s stock of antidumping measures affected developed countries, 22% affected China, and 24% 
affected other developing countries. By 2009, only 25% of India’s stock of antidumping measures was 
imposed against developed countries, whereas 39% was imposed against China and 36% against other 
developing countries. 
A similar trend is observed regarding the percentage of the stock of product-exporter 
combinations subject to an antidumping measure affecting each country category in Figure 6b. In 
particular, the percentage of products imported from China subject to an antidumping measure presents a 
significant increase in 2008-9.21 While in 2007 3.65% of products imported from China were affected by an 
                                                          
20 When counting the total number of 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations, we exclude suppliers that account for less 
than 1% of a given 8-digit HS product’s imports per year.  
21 A sizeable increase is also found by comparing the prediction for that percentage based on a linear time trend regression 
versus the observed one, either at the 6-digit or 8-digit HS product level. 
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Indian antidumping measure, by 2009 that had risen to 7.45%. The percentage of combinations of 
products and other developing country exporters affected reached a peak of 3.21% in 2009. Although the 
percentage of analogous combinations with a developed exporter source also reached its peak in 2009, it 
remained below 1%. 
With the information from Table 3 we can calculate the percentage of Indian imports coming from 
each of the previous country categories. From 1992-2007, 54% of India’s imports came from developed 
countries, 6% from China, and 39% from other developing countries. In 2008-9, 53% of India’s imports 
were exported by developed countries, 11% by China, and 37% by other developing countries. Therefore, 
while an increase in the share of imports from China is associated with the increasing incidence of 
antidumping protection against that country, the share of imports from other developing countries actually 
decreased slightly whereas the incidence of Indian antidumping increasingly concentrated on those 
countries. 
The economic issue of trade diversion is another issue that arises because of India’s use of 
antidumping and non-MFN treatment. Can it help us understand the multitude of occasions in which 
India has imposed new antidumping measures against different sources of the same product, year-after-
year? There are 129 different 8-digit HS products for which, after having initiated an antidumping 
investigation in a previous year, India initiated a new investigation in the same product against different 
exporting countries. These products represent 14% of the total number of products with antidumping 
initiations. Moreover, in 84 (65%) of those cases a final measure was imposed. Since import data at the 8-
digit HS product level is only available since 2000, we cannot determine which exporting countries were 
new entrants into India’s market for a given affected product. We can only say that in 72 out of those 129 
(8-digit HS) products for which India initiated a subsequent antidumping investigation in the same product 
against a different exporting country, the newly affected exporting country had not previously exported to 
India since 2000.22 Gulati, Malhotra, and Malhotra (2005) study antidumping policy in the vitamin-C 
industry in India and find that, although antidumping effectively restricted imports from the countries 
named to be dumping, new countries started exporting the good to India after the petition was filed, and 
this trade diversion in turn led to new antidumping investigations and measures. Our results also suggest 
that trade diversion has played an important role in leading to additional use of antidumping policies. 
                                                          
22 We cannot rule out that the country could potentially have exported that product to India before 2000. 
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 This result suggests that antidumping measures may be used as a form of protection regardless of 
whether dumping is actually taking place, and it could help explain the large use of antidumping by India. 
It also raises the question of why India did not use global safeguards that can be imposed on an MFN 
basis instead of antidumping in those cases, since safeguards can apply to all countries and thus would help 
prevent surges in imports from new exporters. On the other hand, this could help explain why India has 
begun to increase its use of global safeguard measures in 2008-9, which we discuss in Section 4. 
 
3.4 The Duration of Antidumping Measures 
In this section we examine the actual duration of Indian antidumping policy’s temporary acts of 
import protection. The WTO’s Antidumping Agreement mandates a ‘Sunset Review’ process under which 
countries are supposed to investigate whether removal of the antidumping measures after five years will 
likely lead to a recurrence of injury caused by renewed dumping; if not, the imposed antidumping measures 
should then be removed. 
Consider how India’s actions relate to the spirit of the WTO rules in this area. We focus on 
antidumping measures imposed prior to 2005, so that the five-year period has elapsed sufficiently for the 
Sunset Review process to be potentially meaningful. First, we find that 60% of the imposed measures had 
their import restrictions removed within the basic five-year limit stipulated by the Sunset Review process. 
For all measures that have subsequently had the import restrictions removed, the average period for which 
measures stay in force is 4.3 years.  
As Figure 7a illustrates, the most common (modal) duration period is five years, with 58 cases; 
followed by four years, with 56 cases; three years, with 24 cases; and six years, with 17 cases. Overall, 98 
cases had measures revoked before five years, while in 21 cases with measures already revoked they lasted more 
than five years. The minimum duration of measures was one year (4 cases) and the maximum for cases 
that have been removed is 12 years. In addition to the cases included in Figure 7a, there are 83 cases with 
measures imposed before 2005 which have not yet been removed, and thus have lasted more than five years 
but for which we do not know exactly how many years they will be in place.23  
 Figure 7a also allows us to break out the typical duration of measures imposed in the chemicals 
sector, the most frequent user of antidumping in India. There we find that 52% of all measures are 
                                                          
23 We measure the duration for all cases in years, that is, we do not consider in which month in a given year a measure was 




removed within five years, lower than the corresponding percentage over all measures. Moreover, for the 
measures imposed before 2005 that have subsequently been removed, the mean duration of measures in 
that sector is 4.4 years, which is slightly above the average over all measures. There were 26 measures 
lasting five years; 37 measures stayed in place for less than five years; and 13 measures lasted more than 
five years. There have been 45 measures imposed before 2005 that have lasted longer than five years and 
have yet to be removed, which are not pictured. Combined, this evidence indicates that antidumping 
measures in the chemicals sector are more likely to become ‘quasi-permanent’ protection. 
 While not pictured in Figure 7a, we can also examine whether there is a differential treatment with 
respect to measures imposed against China, the country most targeted by India’s antidumping. Here we 
find that the average duration of measures is 4.9 years, which is also higher than the overall average. Of the 
measures imposed prior to 2005 that have subsequently been removed, there were 12 measures against 
China that stayed in force less than five years; 15 lasted five years; and 4 remained in force more than five 
years. In addition, 21 measures were imposed before 2005 that have lasted longer than five years and have 
yet to be removed. Overall, there is some evidence that Indian antidumping measures imposed against 
China tend to last longer. 
 Next, we examine whether, over time, the measures that were imposed five or more years ago have 
or have not been removed. Figure 7b displays the yearly behavior of the percentage of measures imposed 
five or more years ago that are not removed even though the five year limit of the Sunset Review process has elapsed. 
Interestingly, after a decrease in this percentage taking place each year between 2003 and 2007, there was 
an increase in 2008 and 2009. This suggests that another dimension through which antidumping protection 
increased during the global recession is via the failure to remove policies that were imposed prior to the 
crisis and were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the five-year period limit. 
 We also calculated the percentage of measures that were imposed exactly five years ago (and thus 
came up for Sunset Review) and were removed each year.24 This percentage actually shows a decreasing 
trend since 2005; and although it increased in 2008, it fell again in 2009. Therefore, even though in 2009 
India was less likely to remove previously imposed antidumping measures that came up for Sunset Review, 
this seems consistent with previous trends and might not be directly related to the global economic crisis. 
 
                                                          
24 Cadot, de Melo, and Tumurchudur (2008) provide a rigorous analysis of the effect that the introduction of the Sunset 
Reviews into the WTO system has had on the duration of antidumping measures in several countries. 
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3.5 Imposed Antidumping Measures and WTO Tariff Bindings 
For most economists, antidumping is not a policy that is well-grounded in economic theory. 
Because the main legal definitions of dumping – whether it be international price discriminatory or pricing 
below average costs, even temporarily – can be rational, profit-maximizing behavior of firms without 
necessarily any predatory intent (and there is no required evidence for predation found in antidumping 
laws), the policy itself may be viewed as little more than import protection that governments offer to 
industries on a contingent basis. Therefore, suppose we adopt the view of treating antidumping as merely 
one (of many potential) form of import protection. Then, a basic question is, do governments use 
antidumping to raise import barriers to levels that would not otherwise be possible under the rules of the 
WTO system? More precisely, if India did not implement the new protection in the form of antidumping 
measures but instead simply raised its applied tariff rate by the same amount, how frequently would doing 
so result in a violation of its commitments?25 The counterfactual that we adopt in this particular 
application of examining whether India is complying with WTO rules is to imagine that it would otherwise 
impose the same level of protection that it is currently imposing via antidumping, but simply by raising its 
applied tariff by that amount instead of using an antidumping measure. 
 Since it is best to use data at the tariff line (8-digit HS) level to examine this question, we focus on 
the 2004-9 period, given that data on applied tariffs at such level of disaggregation is only available since 
2004. Although most Indian antidumping measures are imposed as specific duties while applied tariffs and 
tariff bindings are ad valorem, we have data on the final dumping margin calculations, which are reported 
on ad valorem terms. In some cases the margin is reported at the level of the exporting firm within an 
investigated country, but in other cases it is only reported as a range of values of new trade barriers facing 
the exporters of that product in a given investigated country. Therefore, for each antidumping case we 
report both the lowest and highest firm-specific antidumping margins corresponding to a given targeted 
country. While admittedly a very facile approach, when viewed from the perspective of this particular 
counterfactual, there is some evidence that India is indeed following the rules of the WTO system. As 
Table 4 indicates, if we use the highest antidumping margin, then in 420 of the 529 instances (79%) in 
which India imposed antidumping measures on a foreign firm’s exports of a given product, the size of the 
                                                          
25 Alternative and more legalistic approaches to evaluating whether a country is following the basic rules on antidumping would 
be to evaluate whether there was sufficient economic evidence of injury caused by dumping, and whether the size of the 
imposed measures was based on the size of evidence of the dumping margin. Such an approach requires access to data well 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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new import restriction was larger than the difference between the product’s applied tariff and the product’s 
tariff binding. A tariff binding is the limit over which India has agreed under the WTO not to raise its 
tariff—also referred to as the ‘tariff overhang’. If we use the lowest antidumping margin, the number of 
instances in which the imposed antidumping measure was larger than the tariff overhang is lower but still 
sizeable.26 The table breaks down this further into two sub-periods, 2004-7 and 2008-9, and shows that 
there has been a decrease in the percentage of cases in which the antidumping measure exceeds the tariff 
overhang; however, considering the highest antidumping margins, the percentage of cases in which the 
imposition of a tariff of equal size would have led to a violation of India’s WTO commitments is still high 
in the later sub-period.  
 Table 4 also shows similar information for the subset of antidumping measures imposed against 
developing countries only. During 2004-9, in 93% of the cases in which India imposed antidumping 
measures on a developing country’s exports of a given product, the size of the new import restriction was 
larger than the tariff overhang corresponding to the same product (using the highest antidumping margin), 
which is higher than for the whole sample over the same period. Moreover, while this percentage between 
2004 and 2007 was similar to the percentage for the whole sample (90% in both cases), in 2008-9 the 
percentage of cases in which the antidumping measure exceeded the tariff overhang was much larger for 
developing countries (97%) than for all countries combined (70%). This is consistent with the finding in 
Section 3.3 that the incidence of India’s antidumping protection has shifted towards developing countries 
during the 2008-9 global recession. Although we do not report similar information corresponding to 
antidumping measures applied against imports from China only, we find that in essentially all instances the 
highest antidumping margin exceeded the tariff overhang both in 2004-7 as well as in 2008-9.27  
 Finally, Table 4 also reports equivalent information for the chemicals sector. In 2004-7, the 
percentage of cases in which the antidumping margin on chemical products was larger than the 
corresponding tariff overhang was higher than the total for all sectors; nonetheless, that percentage fell in 
2008-9 and became fairly similar to the one for the whole sample of products. Thus, along this dimension 
there does not seem to be a shift in the incidence of antidumping protection towards chemicals in the 
latter period. 
                                                          
26 Of course, this also conditions on the size of the Indian antidumping measure as being exogenous, and it also ignores the fact 
that the antidumping measure can be foreign-firm specific and thus is not equivalent to raising an applied tariff, which must be 
done on a most-favored nation basis.  
27 The percentage of cases in which the lowest antidumping margin imposed against Chinese firms exceeded India’s tariff 




4 India’s Use of Safeguards and Countervailing Measures 
While antidumping is India’s most frequently utilised temporary trade barrier, there are other 
relatively substitutable forms of import protection that are in use. In this section we examine three other 
examples that India has resorted to, including global safeguards, transitional China-specific safeguards 
associated with China’s 2001 WTO accession, and countervailing measures for anti-subsidy policies. 
 
4.1 Global Safeguards 
India’s domestic law dealing with the implementation of the Agreement of Safeguards was enacted 
under Section 8B and Section 8C of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975. The procedures were outlined in the 
Customs Tariff (Identification and Assessment of Safeguard Duty) Rules, 1997, and Customs Tariff 
(Transitional Products Specific Safeguard Duty) Rules, 2002.28 A Director General of Safeguards (DGS) 
under the Department of Revenue of the Ministry of Finance was appointed to receive the petitions and 
conduct the investigations required for the imposition of a safeguard duty. The DGS should then submit 
its findings to the Central Government.29  
India initiated its first safeguard investigation in 1997. Between 1995 and 31 October 2010, India 
initiated the most (26) safeguard investigations of the entire WTO membership.30 As Table 1 again 
illustrates, 11 of the 26 investigations taking place between 1997 and 2009 resulted in the imposition of 
definitive safeguard import restrictions. In only one case during that period no injury was found, and five 
cases were terminated. Interestingly, 11 out of the 26 investigations were initiated between 2008 and 2009 
in the midst of the global economic crisis (two in 2008 and nine in 2009), but 8 of those did not result in 
the imposition of a final safeguard measure. Furthermore, in 5 out of the 26 cases most or all developing 
countries were exempt from the application of safeguards.  
The most frequent sectoral user of safeguards has been chemicals, with 14 initiations. As noted 
before, the chemicals sector was also India’s most frequent user of antidumping. Moreover, the WTO 
reports that since 1995 chemical products were the most frequent subject of safeguards (investigations and 
                                                          
28 Section 8C regulates the imposition of safeguard duties on any product imported from China for which increased imports are 
causing or threatening to cause ‘market disruption’ to the domestic industry.  
29 For more details about the applications, investigations and timelines, see the Directorate General of Safeguards’ website: 
http://dgsafeguards.gov.in . 
30 It was followed by, Jordan (15), Turkey (15) Chile (12), Indonesia (12) and the USA (10). Moreover, India imposed the most 
safeguard measures during the same period (along with Turkey). 
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measures) in the world (WTO, 2010b). The second most active sector in India was wood and wood 
products (4 safeguard initiations), and a handful of other industries have also initiated investigations, 
including vegetable products, foodstuffs, plastics/rubbers, textiles, and metals. Each of these industries, 
with the exception of vegetable products, also initiated antidumping cases. Overall, 198 different 8-digit 
HS codes have been investigated under India’s global safeguard activity between 1997 and 2009. 
 
4.2 China-specific Safeguards  
As part of China’s terms of accession to the WTO in 2001, the existing members of the WTO 
were granted access to an additional ‘Chinese safeguard’ policy instrument that could be used to 
implement new and discriminatory import restrictions against China without any evidence of unfair trade 
(dumping or illegal subsidies), but only a surge in Chinese imports, and would last during a transitional 
period until 2014.  
Before 2009, India initiated an investigation under this policy only once – a 2002 investigation of 
‘industrial sewing machine needles’ that did not result in the imposition of final import restrictions. Amidst 
the global economic crisis, however, as Table 5 illustrates, India initiated five China-specific safeguard 
investigations in 2009, over a variety of imported products. In two cases a final measure was imposed, in 
one case no injury was found, and two cases were withdrawn. Overall, 35 different 8-digit HS products 
have been the subject of a China-specific safeguard investigation by India. 
 
4.3 Countervailing Measures  
In January 2009, India initiated its first (and only, as of December 2010) countervailing measure 
investigation to deal with foreign use of WTO-inconsistent subsidies. As Table 5 illustrates, somewhat not 
surprisingly, it was a case initiated against China and over a product in the chemicals sector (sodium 
nitrite). The case was withdrawn.  
 
5 The Interaction of Temporary Trade Barriers 
In this section we describe whether and how the alternative temporary trade barriers interact with 
both one another and with India’s applied tariffs.  
We begin by asking whether the products that were the subject of safeguard initiations between 
1992 and 2009 were also subject to antidumping investigations at some point during the same period. We 
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find that 39% of the 8-digit HS products that initiated a safeguard investigation had also been subject to an 
initiated antidumping investigation at some point. Thus, although there is some degree of overlap between 
both types of policies across products, there is also a substantial percentage (61%) of cases in which 
safeguard investigations were used in products never affected by antidumping. Are there instances in 
which a product is subject to both an antidumping and a safeguard measure at the same time? This turns out 
to be very uncommon. There was only one 8-digit HS product subject to both types of measures in 1999 
and one in 2000, as well as four products affected by both measures in 2004. These findings would seem 
more consistent with a relationship of ‘substitutability’ between both types of policies. 
Regarding China-specific safeguards, the product with the investigation initiated in 2002 was also 
subject to an antidumping investigation initiated in 1998 against China and three other countries, but after 
a preliminary antidumping measure was imposed, the final decision was negative. Six out of the 34 (8-digit 
HS) products that were subject to a China-specific safeguard investigation in 2009 also had antidumping 
initiations, and antidumping measures were imposed against China (and two other countries) in 2004 and 
2008. These cases suggest some examples of which industries were attempting to obtain additional 
protection on the same products; however, in each of those instances, the China-specific safeguard 
investigation was either withdrawn or there was a negative decision. 
Finally, the product subject to the (later on withdrawn) countervailing measure investigation was 
not subject to any antidumping or global safeguard initiation. Overall, and particularly on the basis of 
India’s actual imposition of measures, these findings seem again consistent with the previous statement 
that the temporary trade barriers exhibit more of a relationship of substitutability, and that they are 
typically not used on the same products.  
Although there does not seem to be substantial overlap of different temporary trade barriers over 
the same 8-digit HS products, we can also examine whether there is overlap over the same sectors. Are the 
same sectors the main users of all types of policies (with different products within a sector generally using 
different policies as previously found)? Table 6 presents information on the use of the most commonly 
utilised policies—antidumping, global safeguards and tariffs—across 2-digit HS sectors.  
Consider the use of antidumping and safeguards first. There is substantial overlap in terms of the 
sectors that use those policies. For example, there are 12 sectors that initiated an antidumping investigation 
at some point between 1992 and 2009, and 7 sectors with a safeguard investigation over the same period. 
Out of the 7 safeguard-user sectors, 6 also used antidumping. We also find that this relationship has not 
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changed much during the global recession years. In 2008-9, eight sectors initiated an antidumping 
investigation and four sectors initiated a safeguard investigation. All those four sectors were also users of 
antidumping over the same period. In addition, overall, the chemicals sector was the main user of both 
policies.   
The last two columns of Table 6 show the average applied tariffs at the 8-digit HS level (available 
since 2004, as noted earlier) by sector, with the mean applied tariff over all products reported at the 
bottom of the table.31 As shown, the five sectors that were the main users of antidumping and safeguards 
(chemicals, plastics/rubbers, textiles, metals, and machinery/electric) did not have tariffs higher than the 
overall mean across all products. This is true both across the whole sample period (1992-2009), as well as 
during the global economic crisis (2008-9). Similarly, the sectors with average tariffs above the overall 
mean were not major antidumping users and did not use safeguards at all. In order to interpret these 
findings it is important to take into account India’s tariff liberalisation reform. Bown and Tovar (2011) 
study the relationship between India’s reductions in applied tariffs associated with its unilateral trade 
liberalisation (described in Section 2) and the subsequent reapplication of antidumping (and safeguard) 
import restrictions. They show that the products that Indian industries demanded and received new 
antidumping import restrictions over 2000-2002 were those that had (pre-1991 liberalisation) higher tariffs 
and which had undergone larger tariff reductions (see Figure 2 from Bown and Tovar, 2011). They also 
provide a formal set of regression-based approaches and present significant, product-level evidence that 
the tariff reform itself is associated with subsequent resort to Indian use of antidumping.32 Finally, Table 6 
also shows that the lower average tariffs for 2008-9 relative to the previous years suggest that India was 
able to continue with its process of tariff liberalisation even in the midst of the global economic crisis.33 It 
is possible that the use of temporary trade barriers may have helped India continue such a path.34  
Therefore, we conclude that the alternative forms of import restrictions were mostly used by 
similar sectors, with some substitutability across the policies (formally examined by Bown and Tovar, 
2011) and with different products within a sector generally making use of different temporary trade 
barriers. 
                                                          
31 Since tariff data is not available for 2006, we use the average of the applied tariffs in 2005 and 2007 for that year. 
32 Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) estimate a gravity model for a group of countries and find that the trade decrease 
resulting from India’s antidumping policy is of the same magnitude as the trade increase that resulted from its earlier trade 
liberalisation. 
33 The tariffs also fell relative to 2007. 
34 However, there are other possible explanations for those findings as well that we are not ruling out here, and further research 





In this paper we first examine the behavior of India’s use of temporary trade barriers 
(antidumping, safeguards, and countervailing measures) over time, to then study any changes regarding 
their use that may have occurred during the global economic crisis of 2008-9. We rely on detailed product 
level data from 1992 to 2009 from the World Bank’s Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a). 
 We find that the stock of products subject to an antidumping measure has increased from 1992 
through 2009. Furthermore, the percentage of tariff line (8-digit HS) level products subject to an 
antidumping measure increased significantly during the crisis, from 1.82% in 2007 to 4.03% by 2009, and 
such an increase exceeds what would be predicted based on the observed trends from previous (pre-crisis) 
years.  
We also find that the sectors that are the main users of antidumping policy in India—chemicals, 
plastics/rubber, machinery/electrical, metals, and textiles—are also the major antidumping user sectors 
worldwide. This pattern regarding the sectoral use of antidumping also prevailed during the global 
recession of 2008-9. Moreover, those sectors account for an important share of India’s import value, 
which suggests that the effects of the use of antidumping protection in India may be economically 
important.  
Regarding the exporter incidence of India’ antidumping use, China was the most frequent target of 
Indian antidumping as well as the recipient of the highest average antidumping barriers. During 2008-9, 
this bias in the incidence of antidumping policy against China increased. The share of investigations 
affecting developing countries more generally also increased from 48% in 1992-2007 to 71% in 2008-9, 
even though the share of imports from those countries stayed roughly the same. This increasing incidence 
in India’s antidumping use against China and other developing countries over time is also seen with 
respect to the stock of product-exporter combinations that are affected by an antidumping measure. These 
results are consistent with the findings of Bown (2010b), and suggest a pattern of substantial 
discrimination that may be important to examine further in light of the WTO’s most-favored nation 
principle. 
Furthermore, we find that an additional dimension through which India’s antidumping 
protectionism increased during the global economic crisis of 2008-9 was via the failure to remove policies 
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imposed in the years preceding the crisis that were supposed to be terminated during the crisis under the 
five-year ‘Sunset Review’ limit.  
We also provide some evidence consistent with the possibility that India may have used 
antidumping policy to increase import restrictions to levels that would otherwise violate the rules of the 
WTO system, as well as with the possibility that the use of temporary trade barriers might have helped 
India continue its process of tariff liberalisation in the midst of the global economic crisis. However, those 
are only some among a number of possible alternative explanations behind the observed patterns, and 
further research is needed to draw definitive conclusions. 
Although antidumping is the major temporary trade barrier used by India, we also examine India’s 
use of other forms of temporary import protection. We find an increase in the number of global safeguard 
investigations initiated during the 2008-9 global economic crisis, as well as in India’s use of China-specific 
safeguards. 
Finally, we find that although there is not much overlap in terms of different temporary trade 
barriers being used over the same (8-digit HS) products, there is substantial overlap regarding the sectors 
that use such barriers, both before and during the global recession years of 2008-9.  
Even though our focus in this paper has been on temporary trade barriers, it is possible that India 
may have used other forms of trade barriers during the global economic crisis. For example, in November 
2008, some steel products were placed into the ‘restricted’ list of imported goods, and in 2009 the 
government imposed a licensing requirement on imports of electrical energy as well as an increase in the 
minimum support prices for several cereals. There were also some increases in applied tariffs (although the 
average applied tariffs fell, as reported earlier). For instance, in November 2008 a 20% tariff was imposed 
on imports of soybean oils, as well as a 5% tariff on several iron and steel products.35 Therefore, further 
research would be needed to examine the use of other forms of import restrictions in more detail and 





                                                          
35 See Global Trade Alert (2010). The restrictions on imports of steel products were lifted in January 2010, and the tariff on 
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Table 1: India’s Antidumping and Global Safeguard Initiations and Outcomes: 1992-2009 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a). *Information on final decisions and measures for some of the antidumping 
initiations and one global safeguard initiation in 2009 is still not available.



















Term.  or 
Withdrawn 
             
1992 5 5 5 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1994 7 1 7 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1995 6 6 5 0 0 1 0  0 0 0 0 
1996 21 21 18 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
1997 13 12 13 0 0 0 0  1 1 0 0 
1998 28 19 18 3 5 2 1  5 3 0 1 
1999 63 51 49 9 9 2 3  3 2 0 0 
2000 41 29 32 0 0 0 4  2 1 0 0 
2001 77 62 62 4 6 1 0  0 0 0 0 
2002 77 67 56 3 4 1 8  2 1 1 0 
2003 45 12 26 7 14 4 1  1 0 0 0 
2004 20 9 9 0 4 1 4  1 1 0 0 
2005 25 18 19 0 0 1 5  0 0 0 0 
2006 30 15 30 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
2007 44 23 32 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 
2008 54 33 32 0 0 3 0  2 1 0 0 
2009* 32 31 7 0 0 0 24  9 1 0 4 




Table 2: India’s Antidumping Initiations by Sector and Year: 1992-2009 
 
 
 92 93 94 95  96  97 98  99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06   07  08  09 Total






Animal & Animal  
Products 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.16 0.05 
Vegetable Products 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 3.44 
Foodstuffs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 1.32 0.44 
Mineral Products  0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 3 0 2 14 2.31 35.06 
Chemicals & Allied  
Industries  
1 0 6 2 5 3 7 29 26 28 41 24 10 4 11 24 10 14 245 40.36 9.50 
Plastics/Rubbers  4 0 2 0 2 5 8 9 3 13 0 10 4 8 8 0 4 10 90 14.83 2.34 
Raw Hides, Skins,  
Leather, & Furs 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.26 
Wood & 
Wood Products 
0 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 0 1 1 5 0 1 0 0 5 0 20 3.29 2.09 
Textiles  0 0 0 0 3 0 5 9 4 12 1 2 2 13 0 0 6 2 59 9.72 1.78 
Footwear/Headgear 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.16 0.07 
Stone/Glass  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 10 1.65 15.24 
Metals  0 0 0 3 0 4 3 11 3 5 17 0 0 0 1 0 24 0 71 11.70 6.57 
Machinery/Electrical 0 0 0 0 8 0 5 0 1 11 10 0 6 0 9 20 4 6 80 13.18 16.65 
Transportation  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 3 0.49 4.29 
Miscellaneous  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0.82 2.22 
Total 5 0 8 6 21 14 28 63 42 77 81 45 24 26 30 47 56 34 607 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a).
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Table 3: India’s Use of Antidumping (AD) by Targeted Exporting Country: 1992-2009 
 










Only country named 
in investigation 











transition economies          
 1992-2009    
1 China 13 (0.22) 109 (0.89) 65 (0.50) 0.08 (2) 114.41
6 Thailand 32 (0.05) 22 (0.76) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (24) 64.53
8 Indonesia 23 (0.04) 18 (0.78) 2 (0.09) 0.02 (16) 61.56
10 Malaysia 19 (0.03) 13 (0.72) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (13) 37.83
11 Russia 19 (0.03) 13 (0.72) 1 (0.05) 0.01 (20) 76.90
13 Iran 10 (0.02) 6 (0.60) 1 (0.10) 0.03 (10) 97.01
14 Brazil 9 (0.02) 9 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (26) 68.56
15 South Africa 9 (0.02) 6 (0.67) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (17) 65.63
16 Ukraine 9 (0.02) 3 (0.33) 1 (0.11) 0.00 (28) 70.87
18 UAE 7 (0.01) 5 (0.71) 1 (0.14) 0.05 (5) 97.03
19 Turkey 6 (0.01) 5 (0.83) 0 (0.00) 0.00 (36) 47.84
 Other developing 27 (0.05) 20 (0.80) 5 (0.19) 0.21 46.17
 Total developing 30 (0.51) 229 (0.80) 76 (0.25) 0.46 86.47
     
 1992-2007    
1 China 10 (0.21) 94 (0.90) 53 (0.51) 0.06 (3)
6 Thailand 22 (0.04) 16 (0.73) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (23)
8 Indonesia 20 (0.04) 16 (0.80) 1 (0.05) 0.02 (14)
10 Malaysia 14 (0.03) 11 (0.79) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (12)
11 Russia 16 (0.03) 12 (0.75) 1 (0.06) 0.01 (19)
13 Iran 8 (0.02) 6 (0.75) 1 (0.13) 0.02 (15)
14 Brazil 9 (0.02) 9 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (26)
15 South Africa 7 (0.01) 5 (0.71) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (16)
16 Ukraine 8 (0.02) 3 (0.38) 1 (0.13) 0.00 (31)
18 UAE 7 (0.01) 5 (0.71) 1 (0.14) 0.04 (6)
19 Turkey 5 (0.01) 5 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.00 (39)
 Other developing 19 (0.04) 16 (0.84) 4 (0.21) 0.24 
 Total developing 23 (0.48) 198 (0.83) 62 (0.26) 0.46 
     
 2008-2009    
1 China 26 (0.30) 15 (0.83) 12 (0.46) 0.11 (2)
6 Thailand 10 (0.12) 6 (0.86) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (23)
8 Indonesia 3 (0.03) 2 (0.67) 1 (0.33) 0.02 (15)
10 Malaysia 5 (0.06) 2 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (16)
11 Russia 3 (0.03) 1 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (20)
13 Iran 2 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.04 (6)
14 Brazil 0 (0.00) 0 -- 0 -- 0.01 (27)
15 South Africa 2 (0.02) 1 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (18)
16 Ukraine 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.00 (32)
18 UAE 0 (0.00) 0 -- 0 -- 0.07 (4)
19 Turkey 1 (0.01) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (31)
 Other developing 8 (0.09) 4 (0.67) 1 (0.13) 0.15 




Table 3 (continued) 
Exporting country target 
Antidumping 
investigations 




measures (share of 
target country’s 
investigations)a 
Only country named 
in investigation 











economies          
 1992-2009     
2 European Union 88 (0.15) 70 (0.80) 7 (0.08) 0.15 (1) 72.8
3 South Korea 45 (0.08) 37 (0.84) 4 (0.09) 0.03 (9) 46.54
4 Taiwan 42 (0.07) 34 (0.83) 5 (0.12) 0.01 (21) 73.73
5 Japan 32 (0.05) 19 (0.68) 5 (0.16) 0.03 (8) 84.23
7 USA 28 (0.05) 22 (0.79) 1 (0.04) 0.07 (3) 74.7
9 Singapore 23 (0.04) 17 (0.77) 0 (0.00) 0.03 (12) 62.7
12 Hong Kong 10 (0.02) 8 (0.80) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (18) 84.92
17 Saudi Arabia 7 (0.01) 3 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 0.05 (4) 62.03
20 Canada 5 (0.01) 3 (0.60) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (22) 74.68
 Other developed 8 (0.01) 4 (0.57) 2 (0.25) 0.15 36.25
 Total developed 288 (0.49) 217 (0.78) 24 (0.08) 0.54 64.69
     
 1992-2007    
2 European Union 84 (0.17) 69 (0.82) 6 (0.07) 0.16 (1)
3 South Korea 41 (0.08) 35 (0.85) 3 (0.07) 0.03 (11)
4 Taiwan 39 (0.08) 32 (0.82) 5 (0.13) 0.01 (20)
5 Japan 26 (0.05) 19 (0.73) 5 (0.19) 0.04 (7)
7 USA 27 (0.05) 21 (0.78) 1 (0.04) 0.07 (2)
9 Singapore 22 (0.04) 17 (0.77) 0 (0.00) 0.03 (10)
12 Hong Kong 9 (0.02) 7 (0.78) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (18)
17 Saudi Arabia 5 (0.01) 3 (0.60) 0 (0.00) 0.04 (5)
20 Canada 5 (0.01) 3 (0.60) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (22)
 Other developed 5 (0.01) 3 (0.60) 2 (0.40) 0.15 
 Total developed 263 (0.52) 209 (0.79) 22 (0.08) 0.54 
     
 2008-2009    
2 European Union 4 (0.05) 1 (0.25) 1 (0.25) 0.12 (1)
3 South Korea 4 (0.05) 2 (0.67) 1 (0.25) 0.03 (10)
4 Taiwan 3 (0.03) 2 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.01 (24)
5 Japan 6 (0.07) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (13)
7 USA 1 (0.01) 1 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.07 (3)
9 Singapore 1 (0.01) 0 -- 0 (0.00) 0.02 (14)
12 Hong Kong 1 (0.01) 1 (1.00) 0 (0.00) 0.02 (19)
17 Saudi Arabia 2 (0.02) 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.06 (5)
20 Canada 0 (0.00) 0 -- 0 -- 0.01 (26)
 Other developed 3 (0.03) 1 (0.50) 0 (0.00) 0.16 
 Total developed 25 (0.29) 8 (0.50) 2 (0.08) 0.53 
     
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a) and 
COMTRADE. 
a Excludes cases initiated in 2009 that have not ended yet (and thus information on final measures is still not 
available). b Mean antidumping margin only shown for 1992-2009 since there are not enough observations per 
country in the data for the 2008-9 period to make any meaningful comparisons or inferences. c Targeted 
country’s rank in the total number of initiations over 1992-2009. †For consistency, this table only allows for 
one ‘EU’ entry for each product-specific investigation.  
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Table 4: India’s Antidumping Measures and WTO Tariff Bindings: 2004-2009 
 


























All observations      
  
Total number of 8-digit HS 
product observations 524 529  245 245  279 284 
    
Number of observations with 
AD margin > tariff overhang 223 420  204 221  19 199 
(share) (0.43) (0.79)  (0.83) (0.90)  (0.07) (0.70) 
         
Number of observations with 
AD margin ≤ tariff overhang 301 109  41 24  260 85 
(share) (0.57) (0.21) (0.17) (0.10)  (0.93) (0.30)
    
Developing countries      
 
  
Total number of 8-digit HS 
product observations 378 383  187 187  191 196 
    
Number of observations with 
AD margin > tariff overhang 172 358  159 168  13 190 
(share) (0.46) (0.93) (0.85) (0.90)  (0.07) (0.97)
    
Number of observations with 
AD margin ≤ tariff overhang 206 25  28 19  178 6 
(share) (0.54) (0.07) (0.15) (0.10)  (0.93) (0.03)
    
Chemicals      
 
  
Total number of 8-digit HS 
product observations 353 353  91 91  262 262 
    
Number of observations with 
AD margin > tariff overhang 92 268  78 88  14 180 
(share) (0.26) (0.76) (0.86) (0.97)  (0.05) (0.69)
    
Number of observations with 
AD margin ≤ tariff overhang 261 85  13 3  248 82 
(share) (0.74) (0.24) (0.14) (0.03)  (0.95) (0.31)
    
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a).  
Notes: Based on observations with non-missing antidumping margin and tariff overhang; observations are exporting country-product pairs. 
Tariff overhang calculated as the difference between the country’s bound tariff rate and its MFN applied tariff rate at the 8-digit HS level 
the year of the imposition of the antidumping measure, computed from India’s tariff data available in WITS.  
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Table 5: India’s Use of China-specific Safeguards and Countervailing Measures: 2002-2009 
 
Policy 








Outcome of investigation 
      
1. China safeguard Industrial Sewing Machine 
Needles from China 
1 2002 Despite affirmative final injury 
determination, no final 
measure imposed 
2. China safeguard Soda Ash from China 3 2009 Final measures imposed in 
November 2009 
3. China safeguard Aluminum Flat Rolled Products 
and Aluminum Foil from China 
19 2009 Final measures imposed in 
June 2009 
4. China safeguard Nylon Tyre Cord Fabric from 
China 
2 2009 Withdrawn by industry 
5. China safeguard Front Axle Beam/Steering 
Knuckle & Crankshaft of Medium 
and Heavy Commercial Vehicles 
from China 
8 2009 Negative injury decision 
6. China safeguard Passenger Car Tyres from China 2 2009 Withdrawn by industry 
7. Countervailing 
measures 
Sodium Nitrite from China 1 2009 Withdrawn by industry 
      




Table 6: India’s Temporary Trade Barriers and Tariffs by Sector: 1992-2009 
 
 1992-2009  2008-2009  2004-2009 2008-2009 





         
Animal & Animal Products 4 0 0 0 30.8 30.5 
Vegetable Products 0 2 0 0 42.9 36.1 
Foodstuffs 7 1 0 0 48.5 45.3 
Mineral Products  10 0 0 0 11.0 5.6 
Chemicals & Allied Industries  235 14 24 5 14.9 8.8 
Plastics/Rubbers  82 2 14 0 15.2 9.6 
Raw Hides, Skins, Leather, & Furs 0 0 0 0 12.0 7.5 
Wood & Wood Products 19 4 5 3 13.8 9.2 
Textiles  59 1 8 1 14.8 9.7 
Footwear/Headgear 0 0 0 0 15.2 10.0 
Stone/Glass  9 0 1 0 14.9 9.4 
Metals  70 2 24 2 15.7 7.0 
Machinery/Electrical 66 0 9 0 12.7 7.2 
Transportation  2 0 1 0 33.8 29.7 
Miscellaneous  5 0 0 0 14.0 8.8 
Total 568 26 86 11 18.8 13.3 




Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
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a. Percentage of imported 6-digit HS products with new AD initiations and AD measures 
 
b. Percentage of import value with new AD initiations and AD measures* 
 
 
c. Percentage of imported 8-digit HS products with new AD initiations and AD measures 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010a). *Figure 2b uses data at the 6-digit HS level. 
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a. Antidumping initiations by sector 
  
 
b. Import value by sector 
 
 
c. Percentage of import value by sector 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a) 
and WITS. 
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Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 2010a) and WITS. This figure uses 
data at the 6-digit HS level. 
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a. Number of 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations with AD initiations 
 
 
b. Percentage of imported 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations with AD initiations 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010a) and WITS. 
 



















































b. Percentage of imported 8-digit HS product-exporter combinations with AD measures in force 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010a) and WITS. 
 










































a. Duration of measures (in years) 
 
 
b. Percentage of measures imposed five or more years ago that are not removed 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from Temporary Trade Barriers Database (Bown, 
2010a). 
 

























1998 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Percent
